Tendering Ferry Services in Norway: Ratchet Effects? by Sunde, Øyvind
 1 
 
 
Tendering Ferry Services in Norway: 
Ratchet Effects? 
 
by 
 
Øyvind Sunde* 
Assistant professor 
Molde College, Norway 
Fax.: +47 71 21 41 00 
e-mail: oyvind.sunde@himolde.no 
 
June 1999 
 
 
 
Abstract: 
Fjord crossings by ferries are vital in the Norwegian trunk road system. The ferries are 
operated by ferry companies, each ferry company being a monopolist on a bundle of 
crossings. The government regulates prices and service frequencies and awards subsidies to 
the companies in order to make the ferry services economically viable. Tendering has been 
suggested as a means to induce cost efficiency and thus reduce costly subsidies. In order to 
gain experience with tendering on this area, this regime has recently been introduced on a 
few selected crossings. We argue that this small-scale experiment may not reveal the cost 
savings that may be obtained by a large-scale experiment. This is due to a ratchet effect: The 
incumbent ferry companies may not have the incentives to submit low tenders as by doing so, 
the ferry companies reveals that there is much to gain for the government by carrying through 
a large-scale tender competition in the future. Such a large-scale tender competition may be 
harmful to the companies as compared to status quo. Realising this, each company may be 
reluctant to submit low tenders in the competition for the selected tender crossings. 
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1 Introduction 
 
Fjord crossings by ferries are vital in the Norwegian trunk road system. The ferry services are 
operated by ferry companies, each ferry company being a monopolist on a bundle of 
crossings. Prices and service frequencies are regulated by the central government. As prices 
are insufficient to make the services economically viable, ferry companies receive 
government subsidies. As there are reasons to expect that the ferry companies enjoys ‘the 
quiet life’ of being monopolists, tendering has been suggested as a means to induce cost 
efficiency and thus reductions in the costly subsidies. In order to gain experience with 
tendering on this area, this regime has recently been introduced on a few selected crossings. 
We argue that this small-scale experiment may not reveal the cost savings that may be 
obtained by a large-scale experiment. This is due to a ratchet effect: The port facilities (car 
gangways) requires specifically designed ferries making investments in ferries idiosyncratic. 
Such idiosyncratic investments may act as a barrier to entry which may prohibit potential 
entrants or ‘outsiders’ from participating in a tender competition. In that case, competition is 
limited to the incumbent ferry companies or the ‘insiders’. However, the incumbent ferry 
companies may not have the incentives to submit low tenders as by doing so, the ferry 
companies reveals that there is much to gain for the government by carrying through a large-
scale tender competition in the future. Such a large-scale tender competition may be harmful 
to the companies as compared to status quo. Realising this, each company may be reluctant to 
submit low tenders in the competition for the selected tender crossings. We analyse this by 
making use of a simple game-theoretic model which is presented in section 2. Section 3 
through 5 analyses the game. The paper is concluded in section 6. 
 
2 The model 
 
Although there are several ferry companies in Norway, we will assume (for simplicity) that 
there are only two companies, company 1 and company 2. Company i’s profits is: 
 
 21 iii cδpipipi +=  (i = 1,2) 
 
where pii1 is the company’s profit in period 1, pii2 is the company’s profit in period 2 and δ is 
the discounting factor; 0 < δ < 1. Company i operates a share mi of the total number of miles 
run per period denoted by Q. mi is determined by history. For simplicity, we assume that there 
are constant returns to scale and that the cost per mile is ci. Company i’s total cost, Ci, is thus: 
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Each company’s cost per mile is either cH or cL; cH > cL > 0. Thus, there are three cases to 
consider: 
 Case 1: c1 = c2 = cH 
 Case 2: ci = cH, c-i = cL 
 Case 3: c1 = c2 = cL 
 
Albeit a bit unrealistic perhaps, each company’s cost is assumed to be common knowledge for 
the companies. That is, each company knows not only its own cost but also the cost of its 
competitor. This assumption simplifies the analysis. In order to make the analysis non-trivial, 
the government does not know each company’s cost, only the probabilities: 
 
 pccprob Li == )(  
 pccprob Hi −== 1)(  
 
where 0 < p < 1. We assume that the companies collect the (exogenous) fares on behalf of the 
government. That is, the companies operate on ‘gross cost’ contracts in which each company 
receive a subsidy from the government in order to cover their costs. The government intends 
to minimise subsidies to the companies. Without knowing a company’s true cost per mile 
however, the subsidy to a company must be based on the cost reported by the company 
provided that ci ≤ cH. A company of the high-cost type will reveal truthfully its high cost since 
reporting a higher cost is no option and reporting a lower cost leads to a loss. By revealing 
truthfully a low cost, a low-cost company will not make any profits. By reporting falsely a 
high cost however, a low-cost company earns a profit equal to cH – cL per mile. Thus, the 
government faces an incentive problem of hidden information.1 
 
Suppose that the government decides to carry through a tender competition on a few selected 
ferry links in order to gain experience with tendering as a means to cut subsidies. Further-
more, suppose that the ferry links to be tendered constitutes a share n of the total miles run per 
period; 0 < n < 1. After observing the outcome of this small-scale tender competition 
experiment, the government decides whether to introduce a large-scale tender competition on 
all ferry links or not. Entry costs are assumed to be prohibitively high so that the tender 
competition is between the two incumbent companies only. We consider first-price sealed bid 
                                                          
1
 See for instance Arrow (1986) on incentive problems. 
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tender competitions (or auctions). This constitutes a dynamic game. In stage 1 of the game, 
sometimes referred to as period 1, the two companies decide simultaneously what to bid for 
the tendered routes. In stage 2 of the game, the government decides whether to carry through 
a large-scale tender in the succeeding period or not. If the government decides to carry 
through a large-scale tender competition in the succeeding period, period 2, then the two 
companies decides their bids simultaneously in stage 3 of the game. Dynamic games are 
solved backwards. Thus, we start by analysing the subgame at stage 3 and then proceed by 
analysing the subgame at stage 2 and eventually analyse the subgame at stage 1.2 
 
3 Stage 3: The large-scale tender competition 
 
In stage 3 of the game, the government has either chosen to tender all ferry links or not. If not, 
then each company runs its share mi of the total miles and the government pays a subsidy cH 
per mile. If the government has decided to tender all ferry links and thus all Q miles run per 
period, each company must choose their bid. Each company’s bid is the subsidy per mile 
demanded. Let bij be company i’s bid in the tender competition in period j and let bij(b-ij) be 
company i’s optimal bid conditional on its competitors bid b
-ij. Furthermore, let bij* denote the 
equilibrium strategy of company j. The tender competition is a first-price sealed bid auction. 
Bids exceeding cH are rejected. In case of even bids, the ferry links are split evenly among the 
companies. We consider the tender competition for the three cases in turn. 
 
Case 1: c1 = c2 = cH 
 
This subgame has a trivial solution: As bids exceeding cH are rejected while a high-cost 
company would run a deficit by bidding less than cH, the Nash equilibrium is  
b12* = b22* = cH. 
 
Case 2: ci = cH, c-i = cL 
 
Consider the low-cost company, company -i. Suppose that its competitor, company i, is 
bidding bi2 > cL. If company -i bids b-i2 > bi2, then company i wins the tender competition and 
pi
-i2 = 0. If company i bids bi2 however, that is b-i2 = bi2, then the tendered ferry links are split 
evenly among the companies and company -i’s profit in period 2 is: 
 
                                                          
2
 See for instance McAfee & McMillan (1987) for a review on auctions. Se for instance Fudenberg & 
Tirole (1992) on game theory. 
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which is strictly positive for bi2 > cL. If company -i bids bi2 - ε, ε > 0, then the company wins 
the tender competition and the company’s profit in period 2 is: 
 
 Qcb iii )( 22 −−=− εpi  
 
If ε → 0+, then pi
-i2 approaches (bi2 – cL)Q which exceeds (bi2 – cL)Q/2 for bi2 > cL. Thus, it is 
optimal for a low-cost company to bid just below its competitors bid as long as the 
competitors bid exceeds the company’s cost per mile. Concerning the high-cost competitors 
bid, the optimal bid is cH as bids exceeding cH are rejected while the company would run a 
deficit by bidding less than cH. As a result, the Nash equilibrium is bi2* = cH and b-i2* = cH - ε. 
 
Case 3: c1 = c2 = cL 
  
As shown in the previous subsection, it is optimal for a low-cost company to bid just below its 
competitors bid as long as the competitors bid exceeds the company’s cost per mile. In other 
words, b
-i2(bi2 > cL) = bi2 - ε where ε→0+. As a result, the Nash-equilibrium in the second-
period large-scale tender competition does not involve bids exceeding cL. As companies 
would run a deficit if bids where below cL, the Nash equilibrium is b12* = b22* = cL.3 
 
4 Stage 2: The government’s decision 
 
In stage 2 of the game, the government is to decide whether to carry through a large-scale 
tender competition in the succeeding period or not. It is assumed that the government is 
minimising its expected subsidy payment. If the government does refrain from a large-scale 
tender competition in period 2, the subsidy payment is: 
 
 QcES H=2  
 
                                                          
3
 Actually, the tender competition is a Bertrand price game with exogenous demand. Se for instance 
Fudenberg & Tirole (1992) on Bertrand price games. 
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The expected subsidy payment by choosing a large-scale tender competition depends on the 
outcome of the small-scale tender competition in the first period. In order to make the 
decision non-trivial, the government incurs an administration cost A if it chooses a large-scale 
tender competition in period 2. 
 
Case i: b11 < cH, b21 < cH 
 
As a high cost company would run a deficit if it is bidding below cH, it follows that: 
 
 1),( 211121 =<<== HHL cbcbcccprob  
 
In this case, b12* = b22* = cL and the (expected) subsidy payment in period 2 is: 
 
 QcES L=2  
 
if the government choose to carry through a large-scale tender competition in period 2. In 
order to make the game non-trivial, it is assumed that the (expected) gain by choosing a large-
scale tender competition in period 2 outweighs the administration cost: 
 
  AQcc LH >− )(  
 
Thus, if both companies reveals that they are of the low cost type by bidding below cH in the 
small-scale tender competition in period 1, then the government will choose a large-scale 
tender competition with certainty. 
 
Case ii: bi1 = cH, b-i1 < cH 
 
If it is in the interest for low cost companies to reveal their true cost in the tender competition 
in period 1, then prob(ci = cH, c-i = cLbi1 = cH, b-i1 < cH) = 1. In stage 3 of the game, it is 
shown that if there are one company of each type, bi1* = cH and b-i1* = cH - ε where ε → 0+. In 
this case, the (expected) subsidy payment in period 2 is: 
 
 QcES H )(2 ε−=  
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if the government choose to carry through a large-scale tender competition in period 2. The 
expected net gain by choosing a large-scale tender competition in period 2 is: 
 
 0<− AQε  
 
as  ε → 0+. Thus, if it is revealed truthfully in the tender competition in the first stage that one 
company is of a low cost type while the other is of the high cost type, then it is optimal for the 
government to refrain from a large-scale tender competition. The reason is that the 
competition in the large-scale tender competition will be too weak for there to be sufficiently 
large cuts in subsidies that may outweigh the administration costs.  
 
Suppose however that it is in the interest for one of the low cost companies to conceal that it 
is of a low cost type by bidding cH in the tender competition in period 1. As prob(c1 = c2 = cL) 
= p2 and prob(ci = cH, c-i = cL) = 2p(1-p), it follows that: 
 
(4.1) ( ) )1(2, 2
2
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In this case, the expected subsidy payment in period 2 is: 
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ppp
ppQc
ppp
pES HL )()1(2
)1(2
)1(2 22
2
2 ε−
−+
−
+
−+
=  
 
if the government choose to carry through a large-scale tender competition in period 2. As cH 
- ε ≈ cH as ε → 0+, the expected net gain by choosing a large-scale tender competition in 
period 2 is approximately: 
 
(4.3) AQcc
ppp
p LH
−−
−+
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2
 
 
It is optimal for the government to choose a large-scale tender competition in period 2 only if 
this expected gain is positive.  
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Case iii: b11 = cH, b21 = cH 
 
Suppose that none of the companies reveals that it is of the low cost type, that is both 
companies bids cH in the tender competition in period 1. It turns out that in this case, we may 
rule out that only one of the firms is of a low cost type; see stage 1 of the game. Thus, prob(ci 
= cH, c
-i = c
Lb11 = b21 = cH) = 0. This leaves us with two possibilities, that either both 
companies are low cost  types or that both companies are high cost types. If it is in the interest 
for at least one the low cost companies to reveal its true cost in the tender competition in 
period 1, then prob(c1 = c2 = cHb11 = b21 = cH) = 1. In this case, the (expected) subsidy 
payment in period 2 is: 
 
 QcES H=2  
 
if the government choose to carry through a large-scale tender competition in period 2. The 
expected net gain by choosing a large-scale tender competition in period 2 is: 
 
 0<− A  
 
Thus, if it is revealed truthfully in the tender competition in the first stage that both companies 
are high cost types, then it is optimal for the government to refrain from a large-scale tender 
competition. The reason is of course that there is nothing to gain from a large-scale tender 
competition as compared to status quo as subsidies would not alter. 
 
Suppose however that it is in the interest for both low cost companies to conceal their true 
(low) costs in the small-scale tender competition in period 1. As prob(c1 = c2 = cL) = p2 and 
prob(c1 = c2 = cH) = (1-p)2, it follows that: 
 
(4.4) ( ) 22 2211121 )1( pp pcbbcccprob HL −+=====  
(4.5) ( ) 22 221112 )1( )1( pp pcbbcccprob HHi −+−=====  
 
From stage 3 of the game we know that b12* = b22* = cL when both companies are of the low 
cost type while b12* = b22* = cH when both companies are of the high cost type. In this case, 
the expected subsidy payment in period 2 is: 
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if the government choose to carry through a large-scale tender competition in period 2. The 
expected net gain by choosing a large-scale tender competition in period 2 is: 
 
(4.6) AQcc
pp
p LH
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It is optimal for the government to choose a large-scale tender competition in period 2 only if 
this expected gain is positive. 
 
5 Stage 1: The small-scale tender experiment 
 
In stage 1 of the game, the small-scale tender competition, the two companies are making 
their bids simultaneously. As is common in game theory, the agents are assumed to be 
rational forward looking.  
 
Case 1: c1 = c2 = cH 
 
This subgame has a trivial solution: As bids exceeding cH are rejected while a high-cost 
company would run a deficit by bidding less than cH, the Nash equilibrium is b11* = b21* = cH 
in case of a large-scale tender competition in period 2. 
 
Case 2: ci = cH, c-i = cL 
 
For the low-cost competitor, the optimal bid is cH as bids exceeding cH are rejected while the 
company would run a deficit by bidding less than cH. Thus, bi1* = cH. Concerning the optimal 
bidding strategy for a low-cost company, it turns out that a dominant strategy is to bid just 
below its competitor, that is; b
-i1(bi1* = cH) = cH - ε where ε→ 0+. The reason is as follows: If 
the company does not pay attention to the future, we may apply the same reasoning as in 
section 3 where it was argued that it is optimal for a low-cost company to bid just below its 
competitor as long as the competitors bid exceeds the company’s cost. If departing from this 
strategy is to be optimal for the low-cost company, then it must be in order avoid a large-scale 
tender competition in the future by concealing its low cost by bidding cH as well. However, it 
is not optimal for a low-cost company to avoid a large-scale tender competition in the future. 
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To see this, , notice that in case of a large-scale tender competition, we know from the stage 3 
game that the low-cost company wins the tender competition in period 2 and is paid a subsidy 
cH - ε per mile. As the company is assigned all the ferry links, its profits in period 2 is: 
 
 Qcc LHi )(2 −−=− εpi  
 
In case of no tender competition in period 2, the low-cost company is paid a subsidy cH per 
mile and is assigned its share mi of the total miles run per period. In that case, its profits in 
period 2 is: 
 
 Qmcc iLHi )(2 −=−pi  
 
The gain from a large-scale tender competition is thus: 
 
 0)1)(()()(2 >−−≈−−−−=− QmccQmccQcc iLHiLHLHi εpi  
 
as cH - ε - cL ≈ cH - cL as ε → 0+ and as 0 < mi < 1. Thus, it is optimal for a low cost company 
facing a high cost competitor to reveal that it is of the low cost type. The reason is that facing 
a high-cost competitor, a low-cost company would actually gain from a large-scale tender 
competition as competition will be weak. Thus, the Nash equilibrium is bi1* = cH and b-i1* = 
cH - ε in case of a large-scale tender competition. 
 
Case 3: c1 = c2 = cL 
 
From the above it follows that there is full revelation in the case where there is one high-cost 
company. The same may not hold in the case where there are two low-cost companies. To see 
this, notice that from stage 2 of the game we know that if both companies reveal low costs by 
bidding below cH, the government will carry through a large-scale tender competition in 
period 2 with certainty. In that case, we know from stage 3 of the game that b12* = b22* = cL 
and thus pi12 = pi22 = 0 whereas pii2 = (cH – cL)miQ > 0 in case of no large-scale tender 
competition. Thus, the two companies loose profits in period 2 if there is a large-scale tender 
competition and hence, the companies may have an incentive to conceal their low costs in the 
small-scale tender competition in period 1. 
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Subcase 3.1: Full revelation equilibrium 
 
Suppose that both companies reveal low costs in period 1, that is; b11 < cH and b21 < cH. As 
already noted, when both companies reveal low costs the government will choose a large-
scale tender competition in period 2 with certainty. In that case, we may apply the same 
reasoning as in section 2 where it was argued that it is optimal for a low-cost company to bid 
just below its competitor as long as the competitors bid exceeds the company’s cost. Thus, 
bi1(b-i1 > cL) = b-i1 - ε where ε → 0+. By symmetry, b-i1(bi1 > cL) = bi1 - ε where ε → 0+. Thus, 
if both low-cost companies expect there to be a large-scale tender competition in period 2, 
there exists no Nash equilibrium in the small-scale tender competition in period 2 in which 
the companies bids above cL. As bidding below cL is ruled out as the companies would run a 
deficit, the Nash equilibrium is b12* = b22* = cL. 
 
If b12* = b22* = cL is to be a Nash equilibrium however, it must not be in the interest of any 
company to conceal its low cost by bidding cH in period 1: Suppose that b
-i1 = c
L
. If bi1 = cL 
(full revelation of low costs): 
 
 Qnmcc iiLHi ))(( −−=pi  
 
while if bi1 = cH (no revelation of low cost) then: 
 
 Qnmcc iiLHi ))(( −−=pi  
 
if there is a large-scale tender competition in period 2 and: 
 
 QmccQnmcc iLHiiLHi )())(( −+−−= δpi  
 
if there is no tender competition in period 2. As can be seen, if concealing information (by 
bidding cH in period 1) unilaterally does not prevent a large-scale tender competition, then a 
company has nothing to gain by bidding cH rather than cL. (Strictly speaking, the company has 
nothing to loose either as it earns no profit by participating in the tender competition in period 
1). If concealing information  unilaterally does prevent a large-scale tender competition 
however, then it is rational for a company to conceal its low costs as this increases the 
company’s profits by:4 
                                                          
4
 Of course, if bi1=cH, then b-i1=cL is not optimal; see subcase 3.2. 
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 Qmcc iLH )( −δ  
 
If a company is to prevent a large-scale tender competition in period 2 by unilaterally 
concealing its low cost however, it must be in the interest for the government to abstain from 
a large-scale tender competition. From stage 2 of the game we know that a large-scale tender 
competition is optimal in this case (that is; only one of the companies reveals a low cost) if: 
 
(5.1) 0)()1(22
2
>−−
−+
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Thus, if inequality (5.1) is satisfied, then it is not optimal for a company to unilaterally 
conceal its low cost and b12* = b22* = cL is a Nash equilibrium of the subgame in period 1. As 
this equilibrium involves that both companies reveal truthfully their low costs, this is called 
the full revelation equilibrium.5 
 
Full revelation equilibrium: If: 
 
Lccc == 21  
(5.1) 0)()1(22
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then: 
 
Lcbb == ** 2111  
is an equilibrium in the small-scale tender competition. 
 
The intuition behind inequality (5.1) is as follows: If full revelation of low costs is to be an 
equilibrium, it must not be rational for a company to unilaterally conceal its low cost. We 
have shown that it is rational for a company to unilaterally conceal its low cost provided that 
this makes the government to abstain from a large-scale tender competition in period 2. The 
reason is that the company by avoiding a large-scale company thus avoids a very aggressive 
tender competition in period 2. If the government is to abstain from a large-scale tendering in 
period 2 after observing that only one of the companies is of a low cost type however, the 
probability that both companies are of a low cost type must be sufficiently low as compared to 
the probability that only one of the companies is of a low cost type. If not, the expected 
                                                          
5
 As the game is a dynamic game with incomplete information, the equilibrium is a perfect Bayesian 
equilibrium. 
 13 
savings in subsidy payments by choosing a large-scale tender competition in period 2 
outweighs the administration cost and the government will choose a large-scale tender 
competition in period 2. 
 
Subcase 3.2: Partial revelation equilibrium 
 
Suppose that (5.1) does not hold, that is: 
 
(5.2) 0)()1(22
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In that case, the government will abstain from a large-scale tender competition in period 2 
after observing that (at least) one of the companies reveals a high cost. In that case, we have 
argued (in subcase 3.1) that b
-i1(bi1<cH) = cH. As company i wins the tender competition in 
period 1 by bidding below cH,  the best response for company -i is not to bid cL however. 
Rather, it is optimal for company i to bid just below its competitor, that is; bi1(b-i1=cH) = cH - ε 
where ε→0+.  If bi1 = cH - ε and b-i1 = cH is to be an equilibrium, then b-i1(bi1=cH-ε) = cH: 
Suppose that b
-i1 = c
H
 - ε or b
-i1 = c
H
 - 2ε. In both cases, both firms reveal their low cost and 
there will be a large-scale tender competition in period 2. In that case we have shown (in 
subcase 3.1) that it is optimal for a company to bid just below its competitor. Hence, b
-
i1(bi1=cH-ε) = cH - 2ε. In that case (that is; bi1 = cH-ε, b-i1 = cH - 2ε): 
 
 nQccQnmcc LHiiLHi )2())(( −−+−−= εpi  
 
while if b
-i1 = c
H: 
 
 QmccQnmcc iLHiiLHi )())(( −+−−= δpi  
 
By comparing the payoffs of these two strategies, b
-i1(bi1=cH-ε) = cH if: 
 
 QmccnQcc iLHLH )()2( −<−− δε  
 
As ε→0+, this approximates to: 
 
(5.3) imn δ<  
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Thus, if inequality (5.2) and inequality (5.3) holds, then it is optimal for one low-cost 
company to conceal its low cost by bidding cH in period 1 while it is optimal for its low cost 
competitor to bid just below cH. As this equilibrium involves that only one of the low coast 
companies reveal truthfully their low cost, this is called the partial  revelation equilibrium. 
 
Partial revelation equilibrium: If: 
 
Lccc == 21  
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is an equilibrium in the small-scale tender competition.6 
 
The intuition behind inequality (5.2) is the opposite of that of inequality (5.1). The intuition 
behind inequality (5.3) is as follows: The reason that a company may find it worthwhile to 
conceal its true low cost, is that the loss of profits in period 2 associated with a large-scale 
tender competition exceeds the short run gain associated with winning the small-scale tender 
competition. However, if the company is discounting future profits heavily (low δ) or that the 
company’s share of the total miles run per period (mi) is low, the loss associated with a large-
scale tender competition in the future is small. Also, if the ferry links tendered in the small-
scale experiment constitutes a large share (n) of the total miles run per period, the short run 
gain by winning the tender competition in period 1 may be quite substantial. Thus, if n is 
large and/or δ and mi is low for any company, then it would not be optimal for that company 
to conceal its low cost. 
 
Subcase 3.3: The no revelation equilibrium 
 
Suppose that inequality (5.1) holds so that the government will carry through a large-scale 
tender competition in period 2 after observing that (at least) one of the companies reveals a 
low cost. In that case, full revelation is an equilibrium while partial revelation is not an 
equilibrium. However, is no revelation, that is b12* = b22* = cH, a Nash equilibrium? 
                                                          
6
 Actually, the tender competition in period 1 is a “stag-hunt” game with two equilibra rather than one 
unique equilibrium. In this case, both companies wants its competitor to bid cH in period 1 of the game 
and thus be a “free rider”.  
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If inequality (5.1) holds, both companies must conceal their costs in order to prevent a large-
scale tender competition in period 2. Suppose that b
-i1 = c
H
. If no revelation is to be an 
equilibrium, then bi1(b-i1 = cH) = cH. If bi1 = cH: 
 
 QmccQnnmcc iLHiiLHi )()2/)(( −++−−= δpi  
 
Suppose however that bi1 = cH - ε where ε → 0+. In that case, company i wins the tender 
competition in period 1 but triggers off a large-scale tender competition in period 2. In that 
case: 
 
 nQccQnmcc LHiiLHi )())(( −−+−−= εpi  
 
By comparing the payoffs of these two strategies, bi1(b-i1=cH) = cH if: 
 
 QmccQnccnQcc iLHLHLH )(2)()( −+−<−− δε  
 
As ε→0+, this approximates to: 
 
(5.4) im
n δ<
2
 
 
If b12* = b22* = cH is to be an equilibrium however, it must be optimal for the government to 
abstain from a large-scale tender competition in period 2 after observing b12 = b22 = cH. In 
stage 2 of the game, we argued that this requires (4.6) to be negative:  
 
 0)()1( 22
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Combining this inequality and inequality (5.1) we obtain:7 
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 If (5.5) is to hold, p < 1/3. 
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Thus, if inequality (5.4) and inequality (5.5) holds, then it is optimal for both low-cost 
companies to conceal their low cost by bidding cH in period 1. As this equilibrium involves 
that none of the low coast companies reveal truthfully their low cost, this is called the no 
revelation equilibrium. 
 
No revelation equilibrium: If: 
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then: 
 
Hcbb == ** 2111  
is an equilibrium in the small-scale tender competition. 
 
As the first part of inequality (5.5) is identical to inequality (5.1), the intuition is also the 
same. The intuition behind the second part of inequality (5.5) is as follows: In subsection 3.2 
we showed that if a partial revelation of low cost is not sufficient to trigger off a large-scale 
tender competition in period 2, then it is optimal for one of the companies to reveal it is of the 
low cost type. If concealment from both companies is to be optimal then, a partial revelation 
must be sufficient to trigger of a large-scale tender competition in period 2. If the government 
is to carry through a large-scale tendering in period 2 after observing that one of the 
companies is of a low cost type, the (conditional) probability that both companies are of a low 
cost type must be sufficiently high. The intuition behind inequality (5.4) corresponds to that 
of inequality (5.3). 
 
6 Conclusion 
 
By making use of a simple game theoretic model, we have shown that a small-scale tender 
competition (in order to gain experience with tendering) may give a too pessimistic picture of 
the cost savings that may be obtained in a large-scale tender competition. The reason is that 
the incumbent companies may have an incentive to conceal their true (low) costs as this may 
make a large-scale tender competition less appealing to the government. By doing so, the 
incumbent companies may avoid a large-scale tender competition that is disadvantageous to 
the companies as compared to status quo. In the jargon of the theory of incentives, the agents 
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may have an incentive to conceal their true information as revealing truthfully their 
information would jeopardise future information rents. In the theory of regulation, this is 
called a ratchet effect.8 
 
A crucial assumption in our model is that there are prohibitively high entry costs so that only 
incumbent ferry companies participate in a large-scale tender competition. If entry costs are 
not prohibitively high so that the incumbent ferry companies faces the threat of entry by 
outsiders in a large-scale tender competition however, the optimal strategy of the incumbent 
companies may alter radically. The reason is that the government may decide to carry through 
a large-scale tender competition despite an unsuccessful small-scale tender competition as the 
cost savings in a large-scale tender competition may be substantial due to the entrance of 
outsiders. In that case, concealing their low costs in the small-scale tender competition is not 
an optimal strategy for the incumbent companies as there will be a large-scale tender 
competition anyway. In fact, it may be optimal for the incumbent companies to demonstrate 
rather than conceal their low costs in the small-scale tender competition. By demonstrating 
their low costs, the outsiders may refrain from participating in a large-scale tender 
competition, expecting that the competition will be too tough. Such an entry deterrence 
strategy may be optimal for the incumbent companies as this may soften the competition in a 
large-scale tender competition. If this low cost signal is to be credible however, such a 
strategy may in fact involve bids well below their incumbent companies true costs. In that 
case, the small-scale experiment gives a too optimistic picture of the cost savings that may be 
obtained in a large-scale tender competition. 
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